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ABSTRACT
Collective Wage Setting When Wages Are Generally Binding: An Antitrust
Perspective
by Justus Haucap, Uwe Pauly and Christian Wey∗
This paper explores the anticompetitive effects that wage determination between an
employers association and the industrys labor union may have when wages are
generally binding. It is shown that employers associations can, under certain
circumstances, use generally binding standard wages to raise rivals costs. In
equilibrium, it may be optimal for the labor union to demand a wage rate which is either
above or below the entry deterring limit wage. Hence, it might be the case that a strong
labor union serves as an efficiency enhancing countervailing power, because it keeps the
employers association from raising the standard wage up to the limit wage. The model
is used to explain why both German employers associations and German labor unions
appear to oppose the removal of a specific legal instrument provided for in the German
labor law, the so-called Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung (AVE), which makes
collectively negotiated employment contracts binding for an entire industry. The entry
deterring effect of the AVE suggests that labor market organization is an important
determinant of product market competition and should therefore be considered as part of
antitrust policies.
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ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Kollektive Lohnvereinbarungen und die Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung aus
wettbewerbspolitischer Sicht
Der vorliegende Aufsatz analysiert wettbewerbsbeschränkende Wirkungen, die von
allgemeinverbindlichen, kollektiven Lohnabschlüssen zwischen Gewerkschaften und
Arbeitgeberverbänden ausgehen können. Es wird gezeigt, daß Arbeitgeberverbände
unter bestimmten Bedingungen ein Interesse an allgemeinverbindlichen Tariflöhnen
haben, um strategisch die Kosten der Konkurrenz überproportional zu erhöhen (raising
rivals costs-Strategie). Durch hinreichend hohe Tariflöhne kann ein Marktzutritt von
Konkurrenzunternehmen sogar vollkommen abgewehrt werden. Ob die Gewerkschaft
im Gleichgewicht einen Lohn über oder unter dem marktzutrittsbeschränkenden Lohn
bevorzugt, hängt von den genauen Parameterkonstellationen ab. Das Modell macht
jedoch deutlich, daß eine Gewerkschaft als ausgleichende Kraft (countervailing
power) in Erscheinung treten kann, die eine marktzutrittsbeschränkende Lohnsetzung
durch einen monopolistischen Arbeitgeberverband vereitelt. Das Modell beleuchtet das
Verhalten der deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände und Gewerkschaften und bietet eine
Erklärung, warum sich beide Tarifparteien in Deutschland gegen eine Abschaffung der
Allgemeinverbindlicherklärung (AVE) aussprechen, durch die kollektive
Lohnabschlüsse den Charakter von Minimallöhnen annehmen. Die vorgelegte Analyse
offenbart die wettbewerbsbeschränkenden Wirkungen der AVE und zeigt somit, daß die
Organisation von Arbeitsmärkten entscheidenden Einfluß auf die Wettbewerbsintensität
auf Gütermärkten hat. Folglich sollte die Organisation des Arbeitsmarktes auch bei der
wettbewerbspolitischen Einschätzung von Gütermärkten berücksichtigt werden.
1 Introduction
Labor market organization plays an important role in determining wage levels and
product market structure. This paper incorporates collective wage setting instituti-
ons into an asymmetric oligopoly model and analyzes how they a®ect the industry's
standard wage and the product market structure.
A major, if not the main, characteristic of the German labor market is its tremen-
dously high degree of centralization.1 In Germany, unions, employers and employers'
associations are granted an explicit constitutional right - the so-called Tarifautono-
mie - to negotiate employment contracts collectively, and most employment con-
tracts are negotiated at the national industry level. Moreover, under Germany's
labor law collective wage agreements between a union and an employers' association
can be made compulsory even for independent employers in an industry through
a legal instrument provided for in x5 Tarifvertragsgesetz (TVG), the so-called All-
gemeinverbindlicherklÄarung (AVE). Even though only those unions, employers and
employers' associations that have signed a collectively negotiated employment con-
tract are directly bound by this contract (x3 I TVG), the Ministry of Labor can, on
application of either unions or employers' associations, use an AVE to make some or
all employment terms generally binding for an entire industry.2 AVEs directly a®ect
1For a cross-national comparison of wage bargaining arrangements and institutions see Bunn
[1984], Calmfors & Driffill [1988] and Layard, Nickell & Jackman [1991].
2There are two prerequisits of an AVE: First, at least 50 per cent of the employees in the tari®
area for which an AVE is initiated have to be employed in ¯rms of contract-bound employers (x5 I 1.
TVG), and second, the AVE must be \in the public interest" (x5 I 2. TVG). However, an AVE can
even be put into force if the two conditions are not met, but there exists some \social emergency"
(sozialer Notstand). Hence, the Ministry of Labor has considerable discretion in applying an AVE
to a certain tari® area (see Lindena & HÄohmann [1988a]).
about one million workers (Meyer [1992, 366]).3 Similar provisions to extend the
coverage of collectively negotiated wage agreements exist in many other countries.4
The sectors mainly a®ected by AVEs are characterized by many small ¯rms, low
skilled workers, low capital-labor ratios, a slow expansion of domestic demand and
a comparatively low degree of unionization or membership in employers' associati-
ons (Deregulierungskommission [1991, 151]). As AVEs are mainly applied in
low wage sectors, they e®ectively appear to set minimum wage standards (Sach-
verstÄandigenrat [1995, 228]).
What may be surprising is that both employers' associations and unions heavily
oppose any change to or removal of the legal AVE provisions although both parties
claim that AVEs do not really matter much and that their impact is minor.5 The
impact AVEs have on wage levels is often argued to be relatively low, as in 1998
only 588 out of 47,334 collective agreements were declared generally binding by
AVEs. And only 89 of those generally binding wage agreements directly concerned
wage levels (seeBundesministerium fÄur Arbeit und Sozialordnung [1999]).6
Furthermore, as long as most employers are members of an employers' association,
there is little need to use AVEs, because member ¯rms are directly bound through
collectively negotiated wage agreements in any case.
The importance of the AVE institution might increase, however, as the organizatio-
nal density of employers' associations is declining, especially - but not only - in East
3Kreimer-de Fries [1995, 212] estimates that even 1.5 to 1.7 million workers are directly
a®ected.
4France is an especially vivid example regarding these extension rules, as in France \around
half of all sectoral agreements are usually extended by government decree" (OECD [1994, 171]).
In spite of a very low union density rate of 10 per cent (the lowest rate of all OECD countries)
the coverage rate of collective bargaining agreements is, at a level of 90 per cent, extremely high
(OECD [1994, 173]).
5For the arguments of the employers' associations see Lindena & HÄohmann [1988a], [1988b],
[1989], and for the unions' side see Kreimer-de Fries [1995].
6It should be noted, however, that the number of AVEs almost continuously increased from 448
in 1975 to 588 in 1998.
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Germany (see Keller [1997, 16] and OECD [1994, 176]). As fewer and fewer ¯rms
are directly bound by collectively negotiated employment contracts, member ¯rms
of employers' associations bound by these agreements may be inclined to request a
wider use of AVEs (SachverstÄandigenrat [1995, 231]). In fact, there are some
indicators that the declining membership numbers of employers' associations incre-
ase the importance of AVEs. For example, in East Germany, where organizational
membership is relatively low, the number of generally binding wage agreements in-
creased from 7 in 1991 up to 163 in 1998. In addition, employers' associations in East
Germany also considered using AVEs for the metal producing sector (Kreimer-de
Fries [1995, 222®.]).
What is even more important is that, even if the direct e®ects of AVEs appear to
be of minor importance today, their threat-point character and indirect e®ects may
be substantial. The threat-point character that AVEs contain has also been reco-
gnized by the German Monopolies Commission which comments that \the cartel
e®ect of collective agreements is increased by the possibility to declare them gene-
rally binding. It is misleading to downplay the importance of this legal institution
by pointing towards the small number of collective bargaining agreements declared
generally binding. In January 1994, 544 out of 41,700 collective bargaining agree-
ments have been declared generally binding. However, they aim exactly at those
industries in which the eroding e®ects on collective bargaining agreements through
outside competition would be extremely strong . . . Moreover, this legal institution
contains a normative threat-point potential which aims at stabilizing the system"
(Monopolkommission [1994, 380]).
The idea that ¯rms may be willing to pay higher wage rates in order to raise rivals'
costs is not new. Williamson [1968] already argued that uniform wage rates may
be used to force labor intensive ¯rms to exit a particular industry.7 More speci¯cally,
7Williamson's idea that ¯rms are willing to bear higher costs if they can raise rivals' costs to
an even larger degree has been further analyzed and re¯ned by Salop & Scheffman [1983],
[1987], Krattenmaker & Salop [1986]. In line with this strand of the literature, we explain
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Williamson examines an industrywide wage contract, the so-called Pennington case,
which raised the costs of relative labor-intensive ¯rms to a larger extent than the
costs of relative capital-intensive ¯rms. In his analysis, Williamson uses a Bain-
Sylos-Labini type limit pricing model, in which larger ¯rms can operate at a more
e±cient scale and set limit prices to prevent further market entry. Potential entrants
are assumed to take the ex ante behavior of incumbent ¯rms as given for the ex post
situation when entry has occurred - an assumption that has been correctly criticized
by Selten [1965]. Not only are oligopolistic interactions between ¯rms neglected
byWilliamson [1968], but the behavior of unions - or workers in general - is also
not subject to Williamson's analysis. Williamson [1968, 91] rather assumes that
\an agreement exists between the principal large scale ¯rms in the industry and the
union to impose a uniform wage on all ¯rms in the industry independent of ability to
pay." In contrast, the present paper will also analyze unions' incentives to comply
with high, non-market clearing wages and introduce oligopolistic interactions into
Williamson's basic analysis.8
Our analysis also overlaps with the labor market literature on the degree of wage
bargaining centralization and its implications on macroeconomic outcomes (see, e.g.,
Calmfors & Driffill [1988], Freeman [1988], and Jackman, Pissarides &
Savouri [1990]). Similar to our paper, Petrakis & Vlassis [1997] show in this
context that centralized bargaining can lead to wages above the market clearing
level.
The focus of this paper is on how generally binding wage agreements a®ect wage
determination and Cournot competition among heterogeneous ¯rms. Particularly,
high minimum wages as a means to limit competition and to secure monopolistic rents on product
markets.
8Our paper is also related to the work of Maloney, McCormick & Tollison [1979], who
examine the role that strikes may play in restricting quantities to achieve cartel pro¯ts when the
number of ¯rms is exogeneously given, i.e., in the absence of potential entrants. In contrast to their
analysis, however, we will analyze labor market institutions that raise costs, thereby preventing
¯rms from entering the market.
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in our model we examine the strategic e®ects of the AVE and the incentives of
the incumbent employers' association and the industry's labor union towards wage
setting. The analysis gives conditions under which uniform wages might be used as
an entry deterrence mechanism by the bargaining parties.
A two-stage model is analyzed under two regimes. In the ¯rst regime the incumbent
employers' association has perfect monopsonistic market power on the labor market
and determines the standard wage in the ¯rst stage of the game. In the second
regime, we assume that the industry's labor union sets the standard wage monopo-
listically. In the second stage of the game the incumbent ¯rms and the potential
entrants (if they enter) compete in Cournot fashion on the product market.
We derive the subgame perfect equilibria for both regimes. When the employers'
association determines the standard wage, there is an equilibrium in which it is
optimal for the employers' association to set the limit wage which deters entry. If
the union has all the bargaining power, we show that the labor union either chooses
a wage above or below the limit wage depending on the parameters of the model.
However, as in the former regime, both the labor union and the incumbent ¯rm
bene¯t from generally binding standard wages compared to the reference point with
the competitive wage prevailing. In other words, generally binding standard wages
can be used by the bargaining parties to enforce an industry cartel, which either
accommodates or deters entry. The model is used to explain why both German
unions and employers' associations appear to oppose the removal of the AVE, which
makes collectively negotiated employment contracts binding for an entire industry.
In contrast to conventional wisdom, the analysis also shows that an employers'
association might prefer higher standard wages than the industry's labor union.
Therefore, it might be the case that a strong labor union serves as an e±ciency
enhancing countervailing power, because it keeps the employers' association from
raising the standard wage up to the limit wage.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in Section 2.
In Section 2.1 we derive the ¯rms' equilibrium quantities in the second stage of the
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game. In Section 2.2 the optimal wage demands of the employers' association and
the industry's labor union are presented and conditions are given such that the union
sets a wage below the limit wage. In Section 3 we argue that wage settlements in
East Germany after reuni¯cation can be explained by our model. Section 4 presents
policy implications and concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a product market with k incumbent ¯rms and n potential entrants. The k
incumbent ¯rms are homogeneous and at least as e±cient as the potential entrants.
All incumbent ¯rms are organized in an employers' association. There is one labor
union for the industry. The model consists of a simple two-stage game. In the ¯rst
stage of the game the generally binding standard wage is determined. Then, in
the second stage incumbent ¯rms and entrants (if they enter) compete in Cournot
fashion on the product market. Concerning the wage setting process, we distinguish
two di®erent regimes.
1. Strong Employers' Association (EA): The employers' association has all the
bargaining power on the labor market, so that it sets the generally binding
standard wage in the ¯rst stage monopsonistically.
2. Strong Labor Union (U): The labor union has all the bargaining power and it
determines the industry's standard wage in the ¯rst stage monopolistically.
Both regimes serve as hypothetical benchmark cases to illustrate the incentives of the
bargaining parties in the presence of generally binding standard wages. Throughout
our analysis we posit that the wage rate is the only variable determined in the ¯rst
stage of the game. This means, we adopt the right-to-manage assumption in our
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analysis, so that each individual employer retains its own management right over its
employment level.9
Let us assume that the k incumbent ¯rms and the n potential entrants produce a
homogeneous product. We also assume that labor is the only factor of production.
The output level of each ¯rm depends linearly on each employment level (labor
input level). This means, we assume a constant-returns-to-scale technology. The
incumbent ¯rms and the potential entrants di®er in their labor productivity. The
labor-input-output ratio is given by ®I for the incumbent ¯rms and by ®E for the
potential entrants, respectively.10 We assume that incumbent ¯rms are at least
as e±cient as entrant ¯rms; i.e., ®I · ®E holds. For a given standard wage w,
an incumbent ¯rm has marginal costs of cI = ®Iw which are (weakly) lower than
the entrants' marginal costs, cE = ®Ew. The incumbent ¯rms are indexed by
i = (1; . . . ; k) and the potential entrants by j = (k + 1; . . . ; N), with N ¡ k = n.
In the following, quantities are denoted by q, prices by p and aggregate output
by Q. The aggregate output, Q, is the sum over all quantities produced by the
incumbent ¯rms, QI ´
Pk
i=1 qi, and the aggregate output of the potential entrants,
QE ´
PN
j=k+1 qj ; i.e., Q = QI +QE . The inverse demand schedule is assumed to be
linear and given by p = a¡ bQ for positive quantities.
The utility function of the industry's labor union is given by W = (w ¡ w^)l, where
w^ stands for the reservation wage of the employees, and l denotes the employment
level in the industry.11 This means, the union maximizes its wage revenues, which
9In contrast to the right-to-manage model (see for example Nickell & Andrews [1983]), the
e±cient-bargaining model stipulates that the unions and the ¯rms bargain over wages and ¯rms'
employment levels. For discussions of both approaches see Layard, Nickell & Jackman [1991]
and Bughin [1999].
10The subscript \I" stands for an incumbent ¯rm and the subscript \E" stands for a potential
entrant.
11The wage bill utility function, which is a speci¯c form of a more general quasi-concave union
utility function, is often used in the literature (see McDonald & Solow [1981] and Oswald
[1985]). For other speci¯cations of the union's utility function see Oswald [1985].
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are the surplus income on top of the wage bill under perfect competition in the
labor market.12 We assume that all workers in the industry are members of the
labor union, so that l = QI®I + QE®E holds. The workers' reservation wage, w^,
which is the market clearing wage, is assumed to be exogenous and normalized to
zero.13
2.1 Cournot Oligopoly Equilibrium
By backward induction, we now solve for the equilibrium in the second stage of the
game taking the industry's standard wage, w, as given. The pro¯t functions of the
incumbent ¯rms and the potential entrants are given by ¦I = (a¡ bQ¡ ®Iw) qI
and ¦E = (a¡ bQ¡ ®Ew) qE , respectively. The Cournot-Nash equilibrium output
pair of the second stage of the game (qI ; qE) is determined by solving the k+n best
response functions for each ¯rm:
qt(Q¡t) =
1
2b
Ã
a¡ b
kX
i=1;i 6=t
qi ¡ bQE ¡ ®Iw
!
; for t = 1; . . . ; k; (1)
and
qt(Q¡t) =
1
2b
Ã
a¡ bQI ¡ b
NX
j=k+1;j 6=t
qj ¡ ®Ew
!
; for t = k + 1; . . . ; N; (2)
where Q¡t is the aggregate output of ¯rm t's competitors. By solving (1) and (2)
for qt we derive the unique (and type-symmetric) Cournot-Nash equilibrium which
is given by14
qI =
a+ w(n®E ¡ (n+ 1)®I)
b(N + 1)
; (3)
12In the case of Germany, this assumption re°ects the fact that unions receive about 1 per cent
of their members' payroll.
13Under the Nash Bargaining solution the term w^ is the union's threat point. It is common
practice in the literature to normalize the workers' reservation wage w^ to zero (see, e.g., Bughin
[1999, 1032]).
14Second-order conditions require ¡b(k + 1) < 0 (¡b(n + 1) < 0) for the incumbent (entrant)
¯rms.
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qE =
a¡ w((k + 1)®E ¡ k®I)
b(N + 1)
; (4)
and the aggregate industry output is
Q = kqI + nqE =
Na¡ w(n®E + k®I)
b(N + 1)
: (5)
If the potential entrants do not enter the market, equation (3) reduces to
~qI =
a¡ ®Iw
b(k + 1)
; (6)
where the tilde indicates that only the k incumbent ¯rms are active. Calculating
the reduced pro¯t functions shows that the equilibrium pro¯t for ¯rm t is equal to
bq2t , and therefore depends only on ¯rm t's quantity.
We can now examine how an increase of the standard wage a®ects the ¯rms' equi-
librium outputs. Taking the derivative of equation (4) with respect to the standard
wage w gives
@qE
@w
= ¡(1 + k)®E ¡ k®I
b(N + 1)
< 0: (7)
The equilibrium output of the entrant ¯rms is strictly decreasing for increasing levels
of the standard wage. An entrant ¯rm's decision to produce a positive amount
depends on whether or not it can obtain a positive pro¯t. From equation (4) we
can calculate the limit wage, w0, such that for all w ¸ w0 an entrant ¯rm produces
nothing. The result is stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 The entrant ¯rms do not produce if and only if w ¸ w0, with w0 =
a
®E+k(®E¡®I) .
Proof. By de¯nition of w0, qE(w0) = 0. Thus,
a¡w((1+k)®E¡k®I )
b(N+1)
= 0, and hence
w0 =
a
®E+k(®E¡®I) . Q.E.D.
For the incumbent ¯rms we obtain
@qI
@w
=
n®E ¡ (n+ 1)®I
b(N + 1)
; (8)
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which is non-negative if and only if
®E
®I
¸ n+ 1
n
: (9)
As long as the entrant ¯rms are active, the equilibrium output of the incumbent ¯rms
strictly decreases with increasing standard wages if ®E
®I
< n+1
n
. If, however, ®E
®I
¸
n+1
n
holds, the incumbent ¯rms' output level (weakly) increases with an increasing
standard wage. Lemma 2 characterizes the incumbent ¯rms' output (pro¯t) level
depending on the industry's standard wage.
Lemma 2 The incumbent ¯rm's output (pro¯t) reaches a global maximum at w =
w0 if
®E
®I
¸ n+1
n
holds. For ®E
®I
< n+1
n
the incumbent ¯rm's output (pro¯t) is maxi-
mized at w = 0.
Proof. We prove the ¯rst part of the lemma. From equation (8) we know that qI
is (weakly) increasing over the interval w 2 [0; w0) if and only if ®E®I ¸ n+1n . For
w 2 [w0; (a=®I)) Lemma 1 and equation (6) imply that only the incumbent ¯rms
are active and that the incumbent ¯rms' output, ~qI , is strictly decreasing in w.
Therefore, qI reaches a global maximum at w0 with qI(w0) =
a(®E¡®I )
b(®E+k(®E¡®I) . The
second part follows directly from inspection of equation (3). Q.E.D.
Lemma 2 states that the incumbent ¯rms' pro¯ts are maximized at the limit wage,
if condition (9) holds. As long as condition (9) is ful¯lled, the more e±cient incum-
bent ¯rms bene¯t from an industrywide wage increase up to the point where the
less e±cient entrant ¯rms cease to produce and do not enter the market. Because
®E
®I
¸ 1 holds by assumption, condition (9) is the more likely to hold the larger the
number of potential entrants is. Let us also point out that total industry output is
strictly decreasing as w increases, so that the level of total industry employment is
maximized at w = 0.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium quantities for the incumbent and the entrant ¯rms
in the case in which condition (9) is strictly ful¯lled. An incumbent ¯rm's market
share is strictly greater than the market share of the entrant ¯rm, whenever the
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Figure 1: Equilibrium Quantities and Incumbent Firms' Pro¯ts (®E
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standard wage rate is positive. Incumbent ¯rms' pro¯ts are maximized at the limit
wage w0. The bold curve in Figure 1 represents the incumbent ¯rm's equilibrium
pro¯ts, ¦I , which are a strictly convex function in w.
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2.2 Wage Setting
We now derive the optimal wage demand of the employers' association and the labor
union, taking the optimal strategies in the second stage of the game as given. First,
we examine Regime EA in which the employers' association has all the bargaining
power, so that it determines the standard wage as a monopsonist. Thereafter, we
analyze Regime U where we assume that the labor union has all the bargaining
power.
15The strict convexity of ¦I can be easily checked by substituting the equilibrium quantities
into the incumbent ¯rm's pro¯t function ¦I = bq2I , and di®erentiating with respect to w twice.
For wages below w0, we obtain
d2 ¦I
d w2
= 2
b
(n®E¡®I(n+1)
N+1
)2 > 0, and for wages w 2 [w0; a®I ), we get
d2 ¦I
d w2 =
2
b (
®I
k+1 )
2 > 0.
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2.2.1 Strong Employers' Association (EA)
Only the incumbent ¯rms are organized, so that all members of the employers'
association are identical. The optimal strategy for the employers' association at the
¯rst stage of the game, wEA (the superscript \EA" indicates Regime EA), is de¯ned
as
wEA = arg max
w
kX
i=1
¦i(qI(w); qE(w)); (10)
subject to the constraint that wEA has to be at least as large as the workers' reser-
vation wage, w^, which we normalize to zero. As mentioned above, w^ is the reference
equilibrium wage rate that would be realized on a perfectly competitive market, in
absence of any labor market institution such as employers' associations or unions.
The solution to this maximization problem is stated in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The employers' association maximizes its members' pro¯ts by set-
ting the standard wEA equal to the limit wage w0, whenever
®E
®I
¸ n+1
n
holds. Other-
wise, the employers' association chooses wEA = w^ = 0.
Proof. Follows directly from Lemma 2 and the fact that the objective function of
the employers' association is the sum of its identical members' pro¯ts. Q.E.D.
From Lemma 2 we know that the incumbent ¯rms' pro¯ts are maximized at w0 if and
only if condition (9) holds. Therefore, all incumbent ¯rms would like to raise rivals'
costs by increasing the standard wage to the limit wage, w0. This leads to decrea-
sing total industry output, and hence, to a reduction in labor input and employment
levels. If, however, incumbent and entrant ¯rms have almost the same labor pro-
ductivity (i.e. ®E
®I
< n+1
n
), the employers' association maximizes its members' pro¯ts
by setting the industry's standard wage equal to the workers' reservation wage, with
wEA = w^ = 0.
12
2.2.2 Strong Labor Union (U)
Now we turn to the optimal wage demand of the labor union. The optimal wage
setting strategy of the labor union, wU (the superscript \U" stands for Regime U),
at the ¯rst stage of the game is de¯ned as
wU = arg max
w
W (qI(w); qE(w)); (11)
subject to wU ¸ w^ = 0. The union's wage revenues, W (qI(w); qE(w)), are given by
W ´
8>>><>>>:
WN = [®IQI(w) + ®EQE(w)]w : 0 · w < w0
Wk = [®IQI(w)]w : w0 · w < a®I
0 : a
®I
· w:
(12)
The union's revenue function (12) consists of three parts. For wage levels w 2 [0; w0)
all ¯rms are active, so that both the incumbent and the entrant ¯rms contribute
to industry wage revenues. For wages above the limit wage, w0, only the e±cient
incumbent ¯rms remain active on the product market, and wage revenues are given
by Wk. Of course, for wages above
a
®I
even the incumbent ¯rms cease to produce,
so that wage revenues are zero in this case.
In order to derive the optimal wage o®er of the labor union, we now derive some
properties of the wage revenue schedule. Both wage revenue functions WN and Wk
are strictly concave with respect to w. Hence, there are in principle two candidate
values of w at which the union's overall wage revenue function is maximized. Wage
revenues might reach their absolute maximum at a wage below the limit wage, w0,
or at a wage above the limit wage. In the former case the union prefers all N = k+n
¯rms being active on the product market. In the latter case, the union maximizes
overall wage revenue when only the incumbent ¯rms produce and the entrant ¯rms
do not enter the market.
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Substituting the equilibrium quantities qI , qE, and ~qI from equations (3), (4), and
(6), respectively, into (12), we obtain
W ´
8>>><>>:
WN =
w[a(k®I+n®E)¡w(n®2E+nk(®E¡®I )2+k®2I )]
b(N+1)
: 0 · w < w0
Wk =
wk®I (a¡w®I)
b(k+1)
: w0 · w < a®I
0 : a
®I
· w:
(13)
Di®erentiation of WN with respect to w yields the revenue maximizing wage level
(where the subscript \N" indicates that all k + n ¯rms are active):16
wN =
a(k®I + n®E)
2(n®2E + nk(®E ¡ ®I)2 + k®2I)
: (14)
Similarly, we obtain the revenue maximizing wage level for Wk (where the subscript
\k" indicates that only the k incumbent ¯rms are active):
wk =
a
2®I
: (15)
Straight forward comparison of equations (14) and (15) yields that wN < wk holds
for all parameters ®E ; ®I ; k; n > 0, with ®E ¸ ®I . Lemma 3 gives a necessary and
su±cient condition such that wN · w0 holds.
Lemma 3 The inequality wN · w0 is satis¯ed for all parameter vectors (®E ; ®I ; k; n) 2
R2+ £N2+, with ®E ¸ ®I , if and only if
®2E
®2I
n(k + 1) ¡ ®E
®I
k(3n+ k + 1) + k(2n+ k + 2) ¸ 0: (16)
Proof. We have to specify the range of parameters for which wN · w0 holds.
Comparison of wN and w0 yields
wN · w0 , a[k®
2
I(k + 2(n + 1) + n®
2
E(k + 1)¡ k®E®I(3n + k + 1)]
2(®E + k(®E ¡ ®I))[kn(®E ¡ ®I)2 + k®2I + n®2E ]
¸ 0:
Since the denominator of the inequality's left-hand side is strictly positive, rewriting
gives condition (16). Q.E.D.
16The second-order condition is satis¯ed: ¡(n®2E + nk(®E ¡ ®I)2 + k®2I) < 0.
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Table 1: Values of n
k 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 k ¸ 8
n ; ; 2 5 10 21 56 1
The left-hand side of inequality (16) is a U-shaped function in ®E
®I
which has two
potential roots along the real axis. If no real root exists, wN < w0 holds for all
parameter vectors under consideration. Inspection of condition (16) reveals that
this condition is the more likely to be ful¯lled, the closer ®E
®I
is to one. Indeed, (16)
is ful¯lled for all parameters ®E ; ®I ; k; n > 0, whenever the productivity di®erence
between the incumbent and the entrant ¯rms vanishes. Calculating the roots of the
left-hand side of condition (16) with respect to ®E
®I
, one obtains two solutionsµ
®E
®I
¶
1
· k(3n+k+1)¡
p
½
2n(k+1)
´ ¹;µ
®E
®I
¶
2
¸ k(3n+k+1)+
p
½
2n(k+1)
´ ¹;
where ½ ´ n2k(k¡8)+2nk(k2¡3k¡4)+k2(k2+2k+1). For those solutions being
real ½ has to be non-negative. Obviously, ½ can only be negative if k < 8. Table
1 gives the maximum number of entrant ¯rms, n, for all values of k, such that ½ is
non-negative. From Table 1 we observe that, e.g., for k = 3 the maximum number
of entrant ¯rms is 2, in order to get a real solution. Hence, for k = 3 and n = 2
there exists a parameter vector such that the wage revenue function is increasing
for all w 2 [0; w0). The wage revenue function, WN , always reaches its maximum at
a wage below w0, if no real solution to inequality (16) exists, since in this case the
condition is always satis¯ed. As can be seen from Table 1, this situation occurs for
k · 7 if n > n. If there are only one or two incumbent ¯rms, then condition (16)
holds for all considered parameter vectors.
In the case where only the k incumbent ¯rms are active the following condition
assures that the maximum of the wage revenue function Wk is reached at a wage
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w = wk, which is strictly greater than the limit wage, w0:
wk > w0 , ®E
®I
>
k + 2
k + 1
: (17)
If condition (17) is not met, the wage revenue function Wk is strictly decreasing
over the interval w 2 [w0; a®I ), where only the k incumbent ¯rms remain in the
market. Assume now that condition (16) is satis¯ed. Then, a su±cient condition
that the union's objective function reaches its global maximum at wN is given by
WN (wN) > Wk(wk), what is equivalent with
®E
®I
<
N + 2
N + 1¡ n
k
: (18)
As can be easily veri¯ed the right-hand side of inequality (18) is strictly greater than
one. Based on these intermediate results concerning the wage revenue function, we
can now state the optimal wage setting of the labor union in Proposition 2.
Proposition 2 The standard wage, wU , which maximizes the labor union's objective
function, is given by the following two values:
(i) wU = wN , if 1 · ®E®I < minf¹; N+2N+1¡nk g, or ¹ <
®E
®I
< N+2
N+1¡n
k
holds, and
(ii) wU = wk, if ¹ · ®E®I · ¹, or
®E
®I
¸ N+2
N+1¡n
k
is satis¯ed.
Proof. Assume ¹ · ®E
®I
· ¹ holds. Hence, WN is strictly increasing over the
interval w 2 [0; w0). Since ¹ > k+2k+1 , we know that Wk is strictly increasing at the
point w0, at which WN = Wk holds. Hence, Wk(wk) is greater than WN (w), for
all w < w0 if
®E
®I
2 [¹; ¹]. Inequality (18) is a su±cient condition for wN being the
global maximum. Therefore, we know that the global maximum is reached at wN
if condition (18) holds and ®E
®I
62 [¹;¹]. This proves (i) and the ¯rst part of (ii).
For the second part of (ii), we have Wk(wk) ¸ WN (wN), for all ®E®I ¸ N+2N+1¡nk , since
k+2
k+1
< N+2
N+1¡n
k
holds, for all k; n > 0. Q.E.D.
The following Proposition 3 speci¯es the intervals such that the employers' asso-
ciation (union) demands a higher standard wage than the labor union (employers'
association).
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Proposition 3 Comparison of the optimal wage setting strategies of the employers
association, wEA, and the labor union, wU , yields:
(i) wEA > wU : The employers' association wants to set a higher standard wage than
the labor union, if n+1
n
· ®E
®I
< minf¹; N+2
N+1¡n
k
g, or ¹ < n+1
n
· ®E
®I
< N+2
N+1¡n
k
holds.
(ii) wU ¸ wEA: The labor union wants to set a (weakly) higher standard wage
than the employers' association, if 1 · ®E
®I
< n+1
n
, or ¹ · n+1
n
· ®E
®I
· ¹, or
N+2
N+1¡n
k
· n+1
n
· ®E
®I
holds.
Proof. From Proposition 1 it follows that the employers' association prefers the limit
wage, w0, if
®E
®I
¸ n+1
n
is satis¯ed. From Proposition 2 it follows that the labor union
prefers wN , if 1 · ®E®I < minf¹; N+2N+1¡nk g, or ¹ <
®E
®I
< N+2
N+1¡n
k
holds. Since wN < w0
holds, part (i) of Proposition 3 follows. Part (ii) follows from wN ; wk > w^ = 0 and
w0 · wk. Q.E.D.
According to Proposition 3, a strong employers' association may prefer a higher
standard wage than a strong union. Of course, the optimal wage demand of the
employers' association is strictly below the union's optimal wage, whenever the
productivity lead of the incumbent ¯rms is small, such that ®E
®I
< n+1
n
holds. The
employers' association, however, will set the limit wage, if the labor productivity
di®erence between incumbent and entrant ¯rms is relatively large; i.e., ®E
®I
¸ n+1
n
.
If conditions (16) and (18) are ful¯lled for some ®E
®I
> n+1
n
, then there exists a
vector of parameters (®E ; ®I ; k; n) 2 R2+ £ N2+, such that the labor union prefers a
lower wage than the employers' association. In this case, the labor union bene¯ts
from accommodating entry, and wants to set a wage strictly below the limit wage.
Hence, in contrast to conventional wisdom, it might be the case that the existence
of a strong union is e±ciency enhancing. Given that wage agreements are generally
binding, a strong union might act as a countervailing power, which prevents the
employers' association from setting the entry deterring wage.
As Proposition 3 shows, it is also possible that the union prefers a wage strictly
higher than the limit wage. If the union had all the bargaining power, it would push
17
the standard wage to even higher levels than the employers' association would do.
While many people appear to believe that this is always the case, our analysis has
identi¯ed conditions under which the contrary is true.
Figure 2 compares the optimal wage strategy of the employers' association and the
union for di®erent values of ®E , holding everything else constant. It is also assumed
that the number of potential entrants is strictly larger than the number of incumbent
¯rms,17 and that the intersection between the wN -curve and the w0-curve is to the
right of N+2
N+1¡n
k
. Figure 2 illustrates that the labor union's incentives to deter entry
are on average lower compared with those of the employers' association. Entry
deterrence is optimal from the union's perspective, whenever the productivity lead
of the incumbent ¯rms is relatively large. As a result, there is a range of parameters
for which the employers' association wants to deter entry, while the union prefers
the wage, wN , at which entry is accommodated.
Finally, let us point out that both the employers' association and the labor union
bene¯t from collective wage settlements which are generally binding for the entire
industry compared with the competitive equilibrium, where w^ = 0 prevails.
3 The Deep-Freeze of the East German Economy
The cartelization e®ect of bilateral wage agreements and their potentially devasta-
ting e®ects for employment levels are illustrated by the East German experience
after the German reuni¯cation in 1990. In general, East Germany's prospects for
economic prosperity were believed to be rather shiny, mainly because of its well-
educated and skilled labor force and its rich brother state, which was expected to
generously help with capital as well as technological and organizational know-how.
However, as has been painfully experienced in the last decade, \one of the worst
and sharpest depressions in European history had begun" with the economic union
17This condition follows from n+1
n
· k+2
k+1
.
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Figure 2: Comparison of Optimal Wages (®I = 1, n > k, ¹ >
N+2
N+1¡n
k
)
-
6
1 n+1n
k+2
k+1
N+2
N+1¡ nk
wEA; wU
wEA = w0
®E
wU = wk
wU = wN
wEA = w^
(Akerlof, Rose, Yellen & Hessenius [1991, 1]). The e®ects on unemployment
have been devastating.18
Akerlof, Rose, Yellen & Hessenius [1991] mainly blame unions for recklessly
pushing wage parity between East and West Germany, and their analysis \clearly
singles out West German unions as the villains in the collapse" (Dornbusch [1991,
89]). While there is certainly some merit in this argument, it is our view that em-
ployers' associations are not as innocent as their analysis implicitly suggests. After
the German reuni¯cation the West German collective bargaining system was imme-
diately adopted for East Germany. West German employers' associations joined the
collective bargaining table,19 and as Sinn & Sinn [1992, 165 ®.] have convincin-
18Employment in the manufacturing sector had declined by 74 per cent by the end of 1993
(Deutsche Bundesbank, June 1994, 84). From Fall 1989 to 1992, one in three workers lost their
jobs, in total some three million people. The industrial sector saw the largest lay-o®s, as more
then 1.7 million jobs were lost. For a discussion of the German labor market situation after the
reuni¯cation see Franz [1991], Scheremet [1992], and Scheremet & Schupp [1992].
19Unions were already well established in East Germany before 1990, and membership numbers
in East Germany were comparatively high. Furthermore, the largest employer was the Treuhand,
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gly argued, West German employers did not have any interest in low wages in the
East. Low wage levels in the East would have made the less e±cient East German
¯rms competitive and thereby devalued the employers' existing capital in the West.
Unsurprisingly, wages settled on a high level and increased tremendously.20
Even though investment in East Germany became less attractive as a result of the
high wage levels, the strategy helped protecting pro¯ts in the West. Why did the
East German unions not resist the wage increases? One reason might be that they
were \assisted" by West German union representatives because the East German
unionists were allegedly too unexperienced in matters concerning collective bargai-
ning. Like the West German employers, however, West German unions were not
too interested in low wage competition from the East either. In accordance with
our model, a collective bargaining agreement was reached in March 1991 which ai-
med at an equalization of wages in East and West by 1994 and which signi¯cantly
raised barriers to entry for the less e±cient ¯rms from the East. Both bargaining
parties were quite successful in securing their members' interests by raising wages
and avoiding outside competition. The contrary nature of unions and employers'
associations was set aside in order to stabilize the wage setting cartel.
a state agency, supervising all state-owned enterprises. The labor-managers of the ¯rms under
Treuhand supervision were in a con°icting situation. On the one hand, they were employers at
the bargaining table. On the other hand, they were simply employees of the Treuhand in the end.
Therefore, it was not surprising that these \employers" did not show strong resistance to wage
increases which devalued the existing capital (not owned by themselves).
20Although the productivity in East Germany is well below the West German level, workers in
the East were paid about 69 per cent of their western colleagues' wage per hour in 1996 (Institut
der Deutschen Wirtschaft [1997, chart 137]). The resulting increase of unit labor costs seems
to be the major factor for the excessive employment problems in East Germany. Dornbusch [1992]
already identi¯ed this problem shortly after the reuni¯cation.
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4 Policy Implications and Conclusions
In this paper we developed a simple model to analyze the e®ects of extension rules
- as, e.g., the AVE in Germany - on wage setting and product market competition.
Our analysis has shown that collective agreements about generally binding stan-
dard wages can induce industry concentration on the product market accompanied
with falling sectorial employment levels because both the union and the employers'
association may have incentives to increase the standard wage above the market
clearing level. It has been shown that this cartelization e®ect of collective wage
agreements which are generally binding is largely independent of the distribution of
the bargaining power between the two parties. This result stands in some contrast
to more traditional reasoning which emphasizes the e±ciency aspects of employers'
associations in the bargaining process. As, for example, Nickell [1997, 68] argues,
\unions are bad for jobs, but these bad e®ects can be nulli¯ed if both the unions
and the employers can coordinate their wage bargaining activities." According to
our model the opposite might also happen. Employers' associations which are do-
minated by incumbent ¯rms may even worsen wage bargaining outcomes in terms
of product market competition and sectorial employment levels. Our paper there-
fore demonstrates that unions may improve the wage bargaining outcome. A strong
labor union may serve as an e±ciency enhancing countervailing power, because it
keeps the employers' association from raising the standard wage up to the limit
wage.
The adverse e®ects of centralized wage bargaining for the level of unemployment call
for an extension of antitrust measures to the labor market. The use of instruments
designed to make wage settlements generally binding for entire industries should
be deemed to be anticompetitive, and the use of such instruments should induce
investigations by antitrust authorities.
In general, the entry deterrence e®ect of the AVE suggests that labor market or-
ganization is an important determinant of product market competition and should
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therefore be considered in antitrust policies. It is often argued that collective wage
agreements together with extension rules are e±ciency enhancing, because of tran-
saction and bargaining cost reasons. Those savings may well outweigh the additional
enforcement costs and the welfare loss associated with reduced competition. Howe-
ver, in this case it may be more appropriate from a public policy point of view
to impose a requirement on the bargaining parties to get an authorization for the
respective agreement from antitrust or competition agencies. That would mean the
bargaining parties have to demonstrate the e±ciency gains associated with their
agreement.
Let us also clarify that our model examines the implications of generally binding
wage agreements for a closed economy. Given that barriers to international trade
are now relatively low between Germany and many other jurisdictions, we would
expect the AVE to be of lesser importance for tradable than for non-tradable goods.
Especially in service industries the AVE may still play a signi¯cant role, as service
industries are often labor-intensive and the services produced are often not tradable.
In summary, it is our view that legal instruments that are designed to make wage
agreements generally binding should be abolished. If there is a case for generally
binding wage contracts, these measures should be at least applied in a very careful
manner and only under clear-cut circumstances, which have to be formulated as
precisely as possible. Based on our analysis presented here, a substantial reform of
the German labor law and the AVE system appears to be highly desirable.
Finally, our analysis may also apply to explicit minimum wage legislation, which
exists in many countries, or to costly social obligations and standards imposed on
employers. We think it would be a worthwhile future undertaking to further explore
the interests employers may have in minimum wage legislation and in social obliga-
tions and standards that are imposed on entire industries or even economies, as it
appears to be the case with the European Union's Social Charta.
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